

NAVAL Postgraduate School

Identifying Decision Patterns Using Monterey Phoenix

presented to

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Previous Publications

- This presentation is based on content previously published, as follows:
 - John Quartuccio, Kristin Giammarco, and Mikhail Auguston, presented by Thomas Moulds. Identifying decision patterns using Monterey Phoenix. In System of Systems Engineering (SoSE), IEEE 12th International Conference, 2017.
 - John Quartuccio, Kristin Giammarco, and Mikhail Auguston, presented by Thomas Moulds. Deriving probabilities from behavior models defined in Monterey Phoenix. In System of Systems Engineering (SoSE), IEEE 12th International Conference, 2017.
 - John Quartuccio and Kristin Giammarco. A model-based approach to investigate emergent behaviors in systems of systems. In Larry Rainey and Mo Jamshidi, editors, Engineering Emergence: A Modeling and Simulation Approach. CRC Press, 2018. Publication pending.





- System of System Architectures readily capture the *intended* interactions within the context boundary
 - UML/SysML outlines a means to document system behaviors (ref: <u>https://www.omg.org/</u>)
 - Activity diagrams
 - Sequence diagrams
 - State-space diagrams
 - Use-case diagrams
- What happens when things go wrong?
 - Identify a way to capture both the desired behaviors and the undesirable behaviors of systems?

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- Identification of patterns
 - Topology
 - Semantics
- Behaviors and a proposed analysis method
- Decision model example
 - Narrative
 - Interactions
 - Constraints
 - Analysis
 - Probability of a trace
 - N-squared diagram of all traces
- Wrap up and discussion



- Logical analysis at a high level of abstraction
 - Derived from the essence of a behavior hierarchical and temporal aspects of an interaction
 - Considers the fundamental interactions of the system, both internal and external, but described separately
 - Conducted prior to high cost investment in detailed design
 - Prior to detailed modeling of discrete event, agent-based, physics-based, or hybrid models
 - Prior to physical design and manufacture
 - Enables analysis of both human and machine interactions
- Typical system behavior architectures do not anticipate all possible outcomes, without intentional analysis
 - This problem becomes intractable without tools to help (30 sequential choices of two alternatives results in over 1.07 billion possible outcomes)
 - Derivation of constraints forms a level of requirements to constrain the system behavior to what is expected and desired
- Not intended for detailed considerations such as data through-put, physical performance, geographical or spatial reference



Why consider Patterns?

- Design patterns
 - Re-use of successful patterns
 - Limit or eliminate unwanted patterns
- Model checking
 - Logical consistency
 - Positive-patterns: send then receive, write then read, request then authorize, have fuel then take action, ...
 - Anti-patterns: receive before send, read before write, authorize before request, take action without fuel, ...
 - Discovery of inherent nature of the architecture
- Design analysis
 - Derive the probability of successful outcomes
 - Derive relative frequency of interactions, e.g. N-squared diagram
 - Well-traveled pathways
 - Rare occurrences
 - Modularity of closely related interactions
- Design of experiments
 - Interactions enable an opportunity for verification in test

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
Monterey Phoenix (MP) Basics

- Based upon Small Scope Hypothesis (Jackson, 2012), such that most problems can be found with just a few iterations
- Behavior modeling platform that derives all possible combinations of behaviors, within the scope of execution
- Incorporates a concise language, employing principles of predicate logic
- Behaviors described as hierarchical *(inclusion)*, temporal *(precedence)*, or user-described
- Interactions *within* a system defined separately from interactions *among* systems
- Constraints limit the outcomes of unwanted behaviors and thereby establish a set of requirements for the system
- Attributes easily indicated in the model
 - favorable and unfavorable outcomes used in the example model
- Assertion checking provides a means to query the model, finding any occurrence of a pattern
- Available for anyone to use with the MP-Firebird Analyzer, at <u>https://firebird.nps.edu</u> <u>www.NPS.EDU</u> Approved for Public Release



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Methodology



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Decision Pattern Example



What we can learn from fatal mistakes in surgery

By Dr Kevin Fong Presenter, How to Avoid Mistakes in Surgery

() 21 March 2013 Health

....



In 2005 Elaine Bromiley, a 37-year-old woman attending hospital for what was supposed to be a routine operation on her nasal air passages, suffered catastrophic brain damage after unexpected complications occurred at the start of the procedure.

The importance of checklists

- Surgical checklists are now standard in all hospitals
- Inspired by other high pressure industries like aviation

< Share

- Checklists have helped cut death and complication from surgery by more than a think
- A checklist help minimise the tra hierarchy of the theatre
- It helps all team i to follow basic procedures

Source: Dr Atul Gawa Lead advisor to the W Health Organisation of patient safety



Lessons Learned Home

Searching / Sorting Site Map

View All Acciden Irplane Life Cycle Accident Threat Categories / Groupings Accident Common Themes

UAL Flight 173 near Portland United Airlines, Flight 173, MD DC-8-61, N8082U

Location: Portland, Oregon - Portland International Airport Accident Board Findings (PDX)

Date: December 28, 1978

Recommendations Relevant Regulations Prevailing Cultural /

Accident Overview

Accident Board

On December 28, 1978 a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-61 turbofan powered Organizational Factors airplane operated by United Airlines and registered as N8082U, crashed into a Key Safety Issue(s) wooded suburban area while on approach to Portland International Airport. Safety Assumptions Portland, Oregon

Precursors Upon approach to Portland International Airport, the aircraft experienced a-Resulting Safety Initiative

MATTHEW SYED Black Box Thinking

WHY MOST PEOPLE NEVER

LEARN FROM THEIR

MISTAKES-BUT SOME DO

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r malfunction indication and could not determine if the landing gear

t the landing gear anomaly, and prepare the aircraft for an emergency

fely extended. The flight crew elected to hold at 5,000 feet to

one exception, about 38 minutes into the hold. Fittle was said

te amount of fuel onboard and what was needed to complete the

he airport. Approximately one hour after beginning the hold, and proach to the airport, the aircraft ran out of fuel and crashed

ple onboard the aircraft, ten were killed and 23 were seriously

six miles northeast of the airport.



Photo of United Airlines DC-8 Photo copyright George W. Hamlin - used with permission

Accident Perspectives: Airplane Life Cycle

 Operational Accident Threat Categories Groupings

Crew Resource Approach and Landing



References:

Syed, M. (2015). Black Box Thinking: the surprising truth about success. John Murray. Flight 173: http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=1&LLID=42 BBC Article: http://www.bbc.com/news/health-21829540




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
The Behavior Narrative





The Behavior Events for Each Scenario






Key

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The Behavior Model in Monterey Phoenix POSTGRADUATE


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Topology of the Decision Pattern

The topology is constant for all traces



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
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An Instance of Behavior



Template 9 (T9): Leader fails to consider subordinate input

- Execution of the model produced all possible traces or use cases
- The scenario outlined at the beginning of the presentation is identified as Template 9: Leader fails to consider the subordinate input


Black textboxes are unfavorable

Gray textboxes are favorable

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All Possible Behaviors of the Model





Key:

2 Fewest Interactions24 Most Interactions

16

AVAL DSTGRADUATE Chool

Event type	Event name		Leader	Subordinates	Environment	· Perception	Recognize_environment	Reception	Receive_input	Decision	Correct_decision	Subordinate	Communication	Communicate_observation	13 Problem_state	No_problem	Outcome_state	Successful_outcome	Problem	Not_recognize_environment	Not_receive_input	Incorrect_decision	Failed_outcome	Not_communicate_observation	Routine_procedure	favorable	l unfavorable	
ROOT	FROM \ TO (row\column):		1	2	3	4 12	5	6 12	7	8 12	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23 12	24	25	
ROOT	Subordinates					12		12		12		12													12			ł
ROOT	Environment											12			12		12								12		-	
COMPOSITE	Perception	-					10	12					12							14								
COMPOSITE	Recognize environment	5																								10		1
COMPOSITE	 Reception	6							8	12											4							1
COMPOSITE	Receive_input	7																								8		1
COMPOSITE	Decision	8									8						12					4						1
COMPOSITE	Correct_decision	9																								8]
COMPOSITE	Subordinate	10				12							12												12]
COMPOSITE	Communication	11												10										2				
COMPOSITE	Communicate_observation	12						10																		10		
COMPOSITE	Problem_state	13				24										4	12		8									
COMPOSITE	No_problem																									4		
COMPOSITE	Outcome_state	15																8					4					
COMPOSITE	Successful_outcome	16																								8		
COMPOSITE	Problem	17																									8	
COMPOSITE	Not_recognize_environment	18																									14	
COMPOSITE	Not_receive_input	19																									4	
COMPOSITE	Incorrect_decision	20																									4	
COMPOSITE	Failed_outcome	21																									4	
COMPOSITE	Not_communicate_observation							2																			2	ļ
ATOM	Routine_procedure	23				24									12]
ATOM	favorable	24																										
ATOM	unfavorable	25																										J




NAVAL POSTGRAD **Probability derived from the Behavior Model**

- A model developer has interest in controlling the behaviors of the system of interest
 - Desired behaviors need to be prominent
 - Undesired behaviors need to be identified, then constrained or eliminated
- Constraints form conditional probabilities and can be described within a Bayesian belief network
- Determining the probability of a particular sequence of events (use case) of a Behavior model can help the developer to gauge the effectiveness of the system.

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Applying the Approach to the Cross Domain Problem




- The Monterey Phoenix model topology creates the structure for the Bayesian belief network
- Additional relationship is shown for one of the constraints of the model.

The constraints establish explicit cases for conditional probability.




Constraints




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All Possible Behaviors of the Model





Demonstration of Model Execution







- Behavior modeling of a cross-domain problem provides insight to decision events
- Patterns of behavior identified as templates
- Assertion checking finds all matches to the template, and marks the trace or use case for identification
- Stochastic properties applied to the MP model
- Monterey Phoenix is available for anyone to use at <u>https://firebird.nps.edu</u>





- Behavior analysis helps the developer to derive alternative paths of execution
 - Exposes the logic behind inherent within the model
 - Enables insight to the fundamental nature of the system
- Once the logical level is established, more detailed levels of performance can be investigated



Questions and Discussion

- Questions?
- Discussion?
- Contact information:

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
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• Back-up notes on MP syntax


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Behaviors of the Leader






Event Behaviors of the Leader






Event Behaviors of the Subordinate



Event Behaviors of the Subordinate



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
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
Event Behaviors of the Environment



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Event Behaviors of the Environment



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Coordination – Interaction Across Events POSTGRADUATE

Interaction 1: Shared *inclusion* relationship of the Routine procedure among the Leader, Subordinate, and Environment


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Interaction 2: Subordinate communication precedes Leader receipt of communication

Interaction 3: A Decision by the Leader precedes an Outcome in the Environment

Interaction 4: The Problem State precedes the Perception of both the Leader and Subordinate



Interactions across events are defined separately from the event behaviors, listed on the previous slides. Separating these descriptions affords great flexibility to the model developer.



Coordination – Interaction Across Events

********COORDINATION*** /****Interaction 1: Sharing the routine procedure among all roots * /**/ Leader, Environment, Subordinates SHARE ALL Routine procedure; /**/ /****Interaction 2: Communication by the subordinate precedes the leadership interpretation of that communication */ /**/ COORDINATE \$a: Reception FROM Leader DO COORDINATE \$b: (Communicate observation Not communicate observation) FROM Subord DO ADD \$b PRECEDES \$a; OD; OD; /**/ /****Interaction 3: A decision leads an outcome */ /**/ COORDINATE \$a: Decision FROM Leader. \$b: Outcome state FROM Environment DO ADD \$a PRECEDES \$b; OD; /**/ Interaction 4: The problem state precedes the perception*/ /**/ COORDINATE \$x: Problem state FROM Environment, \$y: Perception FROM Leader DO ADD \$x PRECEDES \$y; OD; /**/ COORDINATE \$x: Problem state FROM Environment DO COORDINATE \$y: Perception FROM Subordinates DO ADD \$x PRECEDES \$y; OD; OD:

Interaction 1: Shared procedure

Interaction 2: Leader receipt of input depends on communication by the Subordinate, as in speaking precedes hearing

Interaction 3: A Decision Leads to an Outcome

Interaction 4: The Problem State precedes the Perception of both the Leader and Subordinate

Interactions across events are defined separately from the event behaviors, listed on the previous slides.

Separating these descriptions affords great flexibility to the model developer.



Types of Constraints

• Logical consistency


- A correct model needs to restrict illogical behavior
- As an example, *If* a message is not sent, *then* it cannot be received, or *If* a car dos not exist, *then* I cannot drive it.

Simplification

- Simplification may be applied to improve clarity and encourage the developer's focus on key events
- As an example, *If* a leader receives input, *then* always have a correct decision
- This results in fewer use cases to analyze
- Design
 - Design requirements may be built to eliminate unwanted behaviors
 - As an example, *If* an aircraft is out of fuel, *then* make the nearest safe landing, ignoring less critical tasks.
 - This example may use automation to achieve the desired result.
- **Definition**
 - Definition of a particular series of events
 - As an example, *If* a leader makes a correct decision, *then* always have a successful outcome



Constraints








Constraints

/****Constraint 1: If there is no problem in the environment,	Constraint 1: If there is no problem in the
<pre>/**/ ENSURE (#No_problem FROM Environment == 1 -></pre>	Environment, then have a successful outcome
<pre>/**/ ENSURE (#No_problem FROM Environment == 1 -> #Successful_outcome FROM Environment == 1); /**/ ENSURE (#Not_communicate observation FROM Subordinates - #Subordinate == 0 -> #Not_receive_input FROM Leader == 1); /**/ ENSURE (#Not_communicate observation FROM Leader == 1); /**/ ENSURE (#Recognize environment FROM Leader - #Not_receive_input == 0 -> #Correct_decision == 1); /**/ ENSURE (#Recognize environment FROM Leader - #Not_receive_input == 0 -> #Correct_decision == 1); /**/ ENSURE (#Receive_input FROM Leader - = 1 -> #Correct_decision FROM Leader == 1 -> #Correct_decision FROM Leader == 1 -> #Correct_decision FROM Leader == 1); ENSURE (#Not_receive_input FROM Leader == 1 -> #Incorrect_decision FROM Leader == 1); /**/ ENSURE (#Constraint 5: A correct decision leads to a successful outcome,</pre>	Environment, then have a successful outcome logical Constraint 2: If all Subordinates do not communicate, then the Leader has no input Simplification Constraint 3: If the Leader recognizes the Environment and does not receive input, then the Leader makes a correct decision Constraint 4: If the Leader receives input, then the Leader makes a correct decision, and If the Leader does not receive input, then the Leader makes an incorrect decision Constraint 5: If the Leader makes a correct decision, then have a successful outcome and
These constraints reduce the number of possible traces or use cases from 128 to 12.	If the Leader makes an incorrect decision, then have a failed outcome









- Prior patterns were demonstrated for the entire system function
- Segments of the system function also show patterns:
 - Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop

