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Practical Modeling Concepts for Engineering Emergence in Systems of Systems

An Overview for the SoSECIE Webinar

Kristin Giammarco, Ph.D.

NPS Department of Systems Engineering

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
Monterey, California


WWW.NPS.EDU





Why Engineer Emergence?


- Stakeholders desire their designed systems to exhibit “positive” emergent behaviors, and to suppress or exclude “negative” emergent behaviors
- How do we know what behaviors need to be suppressed or excluded from the design, before they actually emerge?





















How do we “steer” behaviors in our complex systems?

Unpruned design



Pruned for good behavior





“prune” objectionable behaviors

is to...

as...

is to...



leave behind only the desired behaviors





Positive emergence

is what remains after thoroughly
exposing and removing

Negative emergence.

How do we do that?

Separate system behaviors and interactions




Model system behaviors and environment behaviors

Formalize models for automatic execution



MBSE



Properly allocate tasks to a

Human

error prone →

lived experience
imagination
creativity

(brain)

- inspection
- evaluation
- pattern detection

or Machine


can't do what it's not programmed to do

- computation
- automation
- generation
- view projection





Searches on large data sets

Next:
Automate more of these functions

Use abstractions and refinement to manage large models.





1. Separate behaviors and interactions



Interaction Constraints

- "Provide credentials" from the User precedes "Verify credentials" from the System
- "Deny access" from the System precedes "Re-enter credentials" from the User
- "Grant access" from the System precedes "Access system" from the User

2. Model system behaviors and environment behaviors




Interaction Constraints

- "Provide credentials" from the User precedes "Verify credentials" from the System
- "Deny access" from the System precedes "Re-enter credentials" from the User
- "Grant access" from the System precedes "Access system" from the User
- "Walk away" from the User precedes "Terminate session" from the System



3. Formalize models for automatic execution



```

1  /*****
2
3  A Model for Simple Authentication
4
5  created by K.Giammarco on 05/16/2017
6  modified by K.Giammarco on 08/07/2017 for capitalization of state events
7  modified by K.Giammarco on 08/07/2017 for ENSURE constraints
8  *****/
9
10 *****
11 SCHEMA Authentication
12
13 /-----
14 USER BEHAVIORS
15 -----*/
16
17 ROOT User: Provide_credentials
18           (* CRED_INVALID Reenter_credentials *)
19           [ CRED_VALID Access_system ];
20
21 /-----
22 SYSTEM BEHAVIORS
23 -----*/
24
25 ROOT System: Verify_credentials
26             (+ ( CRED_INVALID Deny_access |
27                CRED_VALID Grant_access ) +)
28             [ Lock_account ];
29
30
31 /-----
32 INTERACTION CONSTRAINTS
33 -----*/
34
35 User, System SHARE ALL CRED_VALID, CRED_INVALID;
36
37 COORDINATE $a: Provide_credentials FROM User,
38            $b: Verify_credentials FROM System
39            DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
40
41 COORDINATE $a: Deny_access          FROM System,
42            $b: Reenter_credentials FROM User
43            DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
44
45 COORDINATE $a: Grant_access        FROM System,
46            $b: Access_system        FROM User
47            DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
48
49 ENSURE #CRED_INVALID <= 3;
50 ENSURE #Deny_access >= 3 <-> #Lock_account == 1;
51 ENSURE #Grant_access >= 1 -> #Lock_account == 0;
52
53
54
  
```



4. Properly allocate each task to a human or to a machine

1. Human specifies system behaviors and interactions


2. Machine generates SoS scenarios from the specification

3. Human conducts V&V on the automatically generated scenarios

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


11 SCHEMA Authentication
12
13 /*-----
14 USER BEHAVIORS
15 -----*/
16
17 ROOT User: Provide_credentials
18 (* CREDTS_INVALID Reenter_credentials *)
19 [ CREDTS_VALID Access_system ];
20
21 /*-----
22 SYSTEM BEHAVIORS
23 -----*/
24
25 ROOT System: Verify_credentials
26 (+ ( CREDTS_INVALID Deny_access |
27 CREDTS_VALID Grant_access ) +)
28 [ Lock_account ]
29
30
31 /*-----
32 INTERACTION CONSTRAINTS
33 -----*/
34
35 User, System SHARE ALL CREDTS_VALID, CREDTS_INVALID;
36
37 COORDINATE $a: Provide_credentials FROM User,
38 $b: Verify_credentials FROM System
39 DO ADD $a PRECEDES $b; OD;
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41 COORDINATE $a: Deny_access FROM System,
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49 ENSURE #CREDTS_INVALID <= 3;
50 ENSURE #Deny_access >= 3 <-> #Lock_account == 1;
51
52 ENSURE #Grant_access >= 1 -> #Lock_account == 0;
53
54

```



Without interaction constraints: 224 scenarios at scope 3
 With interaction constraints: 6 scenarios at scope 3

5. Use abstraction and refinement to manage large models





- These concepts were distilled from modeling with Monterey Phoenix (firebird.nps.edu)
- Experiment with using these concepts in other behavior modeling languages (e.g., SysML, LML)
- Use MP to expose and prune away negative emergence in behavior models

