





# Approach to Capability-Based System-of-Systems Framework in Support of Waval Ship Design

#### **Cdr Jacques P Olivier**

Royal Canadian Navy, Canada

### Dr Santiago Balestrini-Robinson Dr Simon Briceño


Georgia Institute of Technology, United States



System of Systems Engineering Collaborators Information Exchange (SoSECIE)
September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015

### **Outline**


- Background and Motivation
- Benefits, Restraint and Constraint
- Definitions
- Hierarchical Decomposition
- Cross-Functional Decomposition
- Visualisation and Demonstration
- Design Paradox
- Conclusion



http://russellclaxton.blogspot.ca/2009/08/form-and-function-3.html

This paper is an unclassified position paper containing public domain facts and opinions, which the authors alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada, the Canadian Department of National Defence, or the Georgia Institute of Technology.

### **Historical Background**



### **Problem Definition**

- Prolonged period of atrophy in naval ship design and industrial ship building
- Complex nature of rapidly evolving and unpredictable global threat environment
- Proliferation of missions within spectrum of modern conflicts including military operations other than war
- Volatile fiscal and financial environment rendering budgetary forecasting unpredictable



http://shipsstarthere.ca/cont/1.jpe



http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/multimedia/archive/00510/8b485da8



http://cimsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/West-African




http://shtfplan.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/market-crash.jpg

# Purpose

#### **Postulation**

Modern naval ship design should consider the systems of interest as components subsumed by a holistic environment encompassing assets and capabilities inorganic to naval platforms



http://www.spawar.navy.mil/sti/publications/pubs/td/2902/td2902.html

#### **Motivation**

Propose a starting point intended to provide a more defined means of establishing and improving the early phases of the ship design process as part of a multi-layered maritime domain warfare enterprise



http://tomtunguz.com/images/gears.jpg


# **Model-Based System Engineering**

#### Methodology

Formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later life cycle

#### **Restraint and Constraint**

- Will not eliminate all uncertainties and cover all options related to ship conceptual design
- Will better circumscribe uncertainties so to distill a deeper appreciation of the critical factors



http://www.incose.org/chesapek/images/Newsletter/2011\_09\_17\_MBSE\_Diagram.jpg

### **Benefits**

Cohesion

- Providing a more **structured and cohesive approach** to identifying and assessing ship capability portfolio
- Creating a **common language** and conceptual framework for the way to manage and improve capability-based planning within a ship design process

Efficiency

- Identifying capability strengths and interests to be maintained, developed and exploited
- Identifying capability deficiencies (shortcomings or surpluses) to be remedied or accepted
- Ranking ship variants based on operational effectiveness, capability and affordability tradeoffs across a spectrum of missions' priorities

Visualisation

- Facilitating comparisons, identifying and allowing the **sharing of best practice** across major ship acquisition projects within an organisation or a **community of practice**
- Assessing and presenting the findings from a variety of reviews in a format that is easy to understand

Engagement

- Involving more **relevant stakeholders** at all levels in the capability-based ship design process
- Educating stakeholders on the fundamental elements of capability-based ship design and how they relate to their **roles and responsibilities**

### **Benefits**

# Cohesion

- Providing a more structured and cohesive approach to identifying and assessive ship capability portfolio
- Creating a **common language** and conceptual framework for the way to manage and improve capability-based planning within a ship design process

#### Efficiency

- Identifying capability strengths and interests to be many and acveloped and exploited
- Identifying capability deficiencies (shortcomings \_\_\_\_\_\_r) to be remedied or accepted
- Ranking ship variants based on operation fed very ss, capability and affordability tradeoffs across a spectrum of missions' prior fee


#### Visualisation

- Facilitating comparisons, ide (11) g and allowing the sharing of best practice across major ship acquisition projects (thin a proposed in a community of practice)
- Assessing and **preserving** the findings from a variety of reviews in a format that is easy to understand

#### Engagement

• Doolve g more **relevant stakeholders** at all levels in the capability-based ship design process educating stakeholders on the fundamental elements of capability-based ship design and how ey relate to their **roles and responsibilities** 

### **Enterprise Architectural Framework**



- Provide "single source of truth" by creating a logical structure for classifying, organising and presenting complex information in a uniform manner
- Improved clarity on the context within which capabilities re introduced and will operate
- Clearer and more comprehensive requirements documents
- Improved ability to resolve interoperability issues between systems
- Better understanding of the mapping of system functions to operational needs and hence the ability to conduct improved trade-offs

### **Naval Platforms as SoS**

Characteristics	Description	Navy
Operational Independence of the Individual Systems	A system of systems is composed of systems that are independent and useful in their own right. If a system of systems is disassembled into the component systems, these component systems are capable of independently performing useful operations independently of one another.	
Managerial Independence of the Systems	The component systems not only can operate independently, they generally do operate independently to achieve an intended purpose. The component systems are generally individually acquired and integrated and they maintain a continuing operational existence that is independent of the system of systems.	no ground sta
Geographic Distribution	Geographic dispersion of component systems is often large. Often, these systems can readily exchange only information and knowledge with one another, and not substantial quantities of physical mass or energy.	Sildeferse.
Emergent Behaviour	The system of systems performs functions and carries out purposes that do not reside in any component system. These behaviours are emergent properties of the entire system of systems and not the behaviour of any component system. The principal purposes supporting engineering of these systems are fulfilled by these emergent behaviours.	WEB OF CONNECTIVITY
Evolutionary Development	A system of systems is never fully formed or complete. Development of these systems is evolutionary over time and with structure, function and purpose added, removed, and modified as experience with the system grows and evolves over time.	No act of the second se

# **Capacity + Ability = Capability**

### Capacity

- Quantitative
- Resources
- "What"
- "Means"

### **Ability**


- Qualitative
- Methods
- "How"
- "Ways"




http://patdollard.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/us\_armada\_iraq.ipg

- The "means" describe "what" resources are adequate to achieve these objectives within an acceptable level of risk
- The "ways" are the strategic and operational methods describing "how" to conduct military operations to accomplish the specific military objectives, the "ends"

### **Hierarchical Decomposition**



### **Hierarchical Decomposition**



Canada

	CANADA FIRST DEFENCE STRATEGY
1-1	Cana Cana
	tetros reces B-GJ-005-000/FP-001
CFJP 01 – Canadian Military Doctrine	Canadian Forces Joint Publication  CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine  Issued on authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff
	Custodian: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre
_	Canada
	LEADMARK The Navy's Strategy for 2020
101	Detende nationale Canada

			Impact						Geo-		Strategic			Operational										
			cal	or	rate	or	icant	t able		Roles	_	efence I	Policy		Dom Tas					pedit Tas		ry		
			Critical	Major	Moderate	Minor	Insignificant	Not Applicable				al disaster	ed period	5000										
	vays	VH	VH	Н	М	L	NA		Airing	Security .	a natuı extenc	5												
	Lik	cely	VH	Н	М	L	VL	NA		1. Defend Canada 2. Defend North America 3. Contribute to International Peace and Security		such as	n for an world f											
equency	Possibly Unlikely	sibly	Н	М	М	L	VL	NA		you loa	rations	Janada	peration perior per											
2		ikely	М	L	L	L	VL	NA		nerica	tal ope	in Canad risis in (	tional o											
	Rarely		L	VL	VL	VL	VL	NA		anada Jorth Ar	ontiner	l event i uring a c	interna	5										
	Ne	ever	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA		1. Defend Canada 2. Defend North America	ticando	nationa prities de	a major	3										
Strategic	Defence Policy Priorities	2. Suppo 3. Suppo 4. Respo 5. Lead a	ort a major i ort civilian a ond to a maj ond/or cond	nternation uthorities jor terrorisi luct a majo	al event in during a cri attack r internatic	sis in Canad onal operati	da such as a	a natural dis extended pe or shorter p	eriod	VH         VH         V           H         M         V           M         VL         N           VL         VL         V           VL         L         V	Conduct daily dor	<ol> <li>Support a major international event in Canada</li> <li>Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster</li> <li>Benomed the amainstructies attack</li> </ol>	4. Response to a ringly rections entered. 5. Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period. 7. Denloy forces in rections at a crice a bleashare in the world for charge marinds.		[4]	( <del>V)</del>		s (HUMRO)				oterVI		
	Domestic Tasks	2. Huma 3. Assist 4. Aid to	ir and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) umanitarian Assistance ssistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (ALEA) id to Civil Power overeignty Operations								H M L VL	M H V M H N VH VH VI VL VL H	I L N	Rescue (SAR)	A Agonation (A)	מור אפבוורובי (או		Relief Operation	ons (COINOPs)	suc	-) Operations	PSO) - UN Chap	apter VII (MCO)	
Operational	Expeditionary Tasks	6. Intern 7. Non-c 8. Count 9. CANU 10. Stabi 11. NATO 12. Peac	A. International Humanitarian Relief Operations (HUMRO)  7. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)  8. Counter-Insurgency Operations (COINOPs)  9. CANUS Continental Operations  9. Stabilization Operations  1. NATO Response Force (NRF) Operations  2. Peace Support Operations (PSO) - UN Chapter VI  3. Peace Enforcement - UN Chapter VII									L L L  NA NA VI  VL VL V  VL VL V  VL VL L  VL VL V	M H VH L H VL VI L VL VI V VH VI V VH VI	and Maritime Search and	Humanitarian Assistance	Assistance to Law Enrollering Aid to Civil Power	Sovereignty Operations	International Humanitarian Relief Operations (HUMRO)	Counter-Insurgency Operations (COINOPs)	CANUS Continental Operations	NATO Response Force (NRF) Operations	Peace Support Operations (PSO) - UN Chapter VI	. Peace Enforcement - UN Chapter VII . Major Combat Operations (MCO)	

NA NA

NA NA NA NA NA

14. Major Combat Operations (MCO) 1. Air and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR)

3. Assistance to Law Enforcement Agency

7. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO)

9. Littoral Maritime Force Projection

8. Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

10. Standing NATO Response Force Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) 11. United States Task Group (e.g., CSG, ESG, MEU)


2. Humanitarian Assistance

4. Fisheries Patrols 5. Sovereignty Patrols 6. Arctic Sovereignty Patrols


# **Naval SoS Levels**

Rank	Typology	Description
1	Complete Major Global Force Projection	Capable of carrying out all the military roles of naval forces on a global scale. It possesses the full range of carrier and amphibious capabilities, sea control forces, and nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines, and all in sufficient numbers to undertake major operations independently.
2	Partial Global Force Projection	Possesses most if not all of the force projection capabilities of a "complete" global navy, but only in sufficient numbers to undertake one major "out of area" operation.
3	Medium Global Force Projection	May not possess the full range of capabilities, but have a credible capacity in certain of them and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies.
4	Medium Regional Force Projection	Possesses the ability to project force into the adjoining ocean basin. While may have the capacity to exercise these further afield, for whatever reason, do not do so on a regular basis.
5	Adjacent Force Projection	Possesses some ability to project force well offshore, but not capable of carrying out high-level naval operations over oceanic distances.
6	Offshore Territorial Defence	Possesses relatively high levels of capability in defensive (and constabulary) operations up to about 200 miles from shores, having the sustainability offered by frigate or large corvette vessels and (or) a capable submarine force.
7	Inshore Territorial Defence	Primarily inshore territorial defence capabilities, capable of coastal combat rather than constabulary duties alone. This implies a force comprising missile-armed fast-attack craft, short-range aviation and a limited submarine force.
8	Constabulary Defence	Not intended to fight, but to act purely in a constabulary role.

# **Visualization 1**



### **Hierarchical to Functional Decomposition**



# **Cross-Functional Decomposition**

**Capability Priorities** 

Float

Move

Fight

Platform Systems Capabilities

Habitability
Sustainability
Survivability
Mobility
Manoeuvrability
Operability
Interoperability

Combat Systems Capabilities

C4ISR
Anti-Surface Warfare
Anti-Air Warfare
Anti-Submarine Warfare
Area Air Defence
Mine Counter Measure
Maritime Interdiction

Operational Capability Readiness

#### Restricted:

Subject to deficiencies in personnel, materiel and training severely limiting employment

#### Standard:

Core naval continental and expeditionary missions that do not entail the possibility of high intensity, full spectrum combat

#### High:

Full-spectrum of combat operations

**Capability across functional areas and technology domains** 

# **Cross-Functional Decomposition**

**Capability Priorities Float** Move **Fight** 

#### **Platform Systems Capabilities**

- Habitability
- Sustainability
- Survivability
- Mobility
- Manoeuvrability
- Operability
- Interoperability

#### **Combat Systems Capabilities**

- C4ISR
- Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW)
- Maritime Interdiction
- Mine Counter Measures (MCM)
- Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
- Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)
- Area Air Defence (AAD)



# **Visualization 2**



# **Domestic Constabulary Variant**



# **Expeditionary Variant**



#### **Arctic Patrol Variant**




### **Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) Variant**




### (Imbalanced) Maritime Interdiction Ops Variant




#### Capability-based SoS Approach to Naval Ship Design



#### Capability-based SoS Approach to Naval Ship Design




# **Design Process Paradox**



Use SoSE methodology and apply MBSE techniques to naval ship design to enable rapid, defensible and traceable capability trade-offs in the early stages of design

# **Design Process Paradox**




Use SoSE methodology and apply MBSE techniques to naval ship design to enable rapid, defensible and traceable capability trade-offs in the early stages of design

# **Purpose Revisited**

#### **Postulation**

Modern naval ship design should consider the systems of interest as components subsumed by a holistic environment encompassing assets and capabilities inorganic to naval platforms



http://www.spawar.navy.mil/sti/publications/pubs/td/2902/td2902.html

#### **Motivation**

Propose a starting point intended to provide a more defined means of establishing and improving the ship design process as part of a multi-layered maritime domain warfare enterprise



http://tomtunguz.com/images/gears.jpg

# **Questions?**

#### Santiago Balestrini-Robinson

BEng, MSc, PhD santiago.balestrini@gtri.gatech.edu

Jacques P. Olivier

CD, BEng, MSc, MBA, PEng, PMP, IMarEST jacques.olivier@forces.gc.ca

This paper is an unclassified position paper containing public domain facts and opinions, which the authors alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada, the Canadian Department of National Defence, or the Georgia Institute of Technology.