

SoSECIE Webinar

Welcome to the
2021 System of Systems Engineering Collaborators
Information Exchange (SoSECIE)



We will start at 11AM Eastern Time

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<https://mitre.tahoe.appsembler.com/blog>

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NDIA System of Systems SE Committee

- **Mission**

- To provide a forum where government, industry, and academia can share lessons learned, promote best practices, address issues, and advocate systems engineering for Systems of Systems (SoS)
- To identify successful strategies for applying systems engineering principles to systems engineering of SoS

- **Operating Practices**

- Face to face and virtual SoS Committee meetings are held in conjunction with NDIA SE Division meetings that occur in February, April, June, and August

NDIA SE Division SoS Committee Industry Chairs:

Mr. Rick Poel, Boeing

Ms. Jennie Horne, Raytheon

OSD Liaison:

Dr. Judith Dahmann, MITRE

Simple Rules of Engagement

- I have muted all participant lines for this introduction and the briefing.
- If you need to contact me during the briefing, send me an e-mail at sosecie@mitre.org.
- Download the presentation so you can follow along on your own
- We will hold all questions until the end:
 - I will start with questions submitted online via the CHAT window in Teams.
 - I will then take questions via telephone; State your name, organization, and question clearly.
- If a question requires more discussion, the speaker(s) contact info is in the brief.

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2021-2022 System of Systems Engineering Collaborators Information Exchange Webinars

Sponsored by MITRE and NDIA SE Division

June 29, 2021

Digital Engineering: From Toolchain to Platform

Dr. Aleksandra Markina-Khusid

July 13, 2021

***Developing Meta Systems Architectures for Leading Innovation with Complex Societal and
Technical Challenges***

Dr. Cihan Dagli

July 27, 2021

Advancements Towards a Digital Approach for Mission Engineering

Todd Shayler and Daniel Browne

Implementing a Digital Engineering Environment for Mission Engineering

Dr. Jeffrey C. Boulware
Joint Staff J8 JIAMD


Jon Kim
Nathan Norwood
Matt Cotter
Eric Beene
Jason Anderson
MITRE



MITRE

IAMD Mission Space

Figure 1. Subcategories of Threats




Credit: Gabriel Almodovar, Daniel P. Allmacher, Morgan P. Ames III, and Chad Davies, JFQ 88, 1st Quarter 2018

Key Insight

A Digital Engineering Environment developed for any IAMD mission can be easily re-factored to address the others.


Current work is focused on analysis of Countering Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (**C-sUAS**) – which has been expanded to Cruise Missile Defense of the Homeland (**CMD-H**) in FY21.



Two Complementary Analytical Approaches


Start with knowns – *“Make the most of what you have”*

Given existing C-sUAS system parameters, **determine the optimal set of capabilities** for a given scenario.



Start with requirements – *“Buy the best of what you need”*



Given adversary capabilities and BF CONOPs, **derive the required C-sUAS capabilities and parameters** that optimize performance for a given scenario.



Operational Use Case – C-UAS Concepts

C-sUAS Components & Capabilities

- C-sUAS System may have one or more than one of the components required to complete the kill web
- Complete kill web **may require multiple C-sUAS Systems** for a given scenario and appropriate C2 linkages



Source: Joint Publication 3-60, 2018

Kill Web




A useful model must capture both **what is done** and **what is used to do it**























- **Activity:** Information on the steps (and sub-steps) in the kill web, and which equipment is used to conduct them
- **Inventory:** Information on each C-sUAS system (and subsystem)



JIAMDO DE Environment – Process Flow




Digital Engineering Environment – CUAS Mission Model

	Product Type: Scopes the viewpoint of each product			
	REQUIREMENTS	BEHAVIOR	STRUCTURE	PARAMETERS
Mission Level: What problem is being modeled	Stakeholder Needs  Fixed / Semi-Fixed Mission Overview  C-UAS CDD Requirements	Use Cases  Dynamic Targeting Use Case  C-UAS Dynamic Targeting	System Context  C-UxS Systems	Measures of Effectiveness  Measures of Effectiveness  Cost Items
System of Systems: Describes the SoS to address the problem and verify the solutions.	System Requirements  System Satisfy Matrix  Notional SoS	System Behavior  C-UAS System A  C-UAS System B	System Structure  C-UAS System A  C-UAS System B	Measures of Performance  System Sensing Performance  Kinetic Effectors Performance  Non-Kinetic Effectors Performance
Model: Describes how the M&S application will represent a portion of the problem space to validate the solutions	Simulation Requirements	Simulation Behavior  Baseline Config  To Be Config	Simulation Structure  Baseline Systems  To Be Systems	Test Case  



Operational Behavior – Dynamic Targeting Process



	Name	Attributes			Attributes
1	30mm Cannon	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Rapid Prototype <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = -	17	EnforceAir	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Dismounted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = CTSO
2	APS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USA	18	FAAD <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USA
3	Asudri	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = SOCOM	19	Guardian	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Rapid Prototype <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = -
4	Bal Cheti	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Dismounted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = SOCOM	20	I-MAZES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Mobile / Mount / Afloat <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USMC
5	C-AUGS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Fixed / Semi-F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USAF	21	IPWS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USA
6	Chadai	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Dismounted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = SOCOM	22	M-LDS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Fixed / Semi-F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = CTSO
7	CLAWS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Rapid Prototype <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = -	23	MAZS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Mobile / Mount / Afloat <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USAF
8	CORDW	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Fixed / Semi-F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USA, USN	24	MEDUSA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Mobile / Mount / Afloat <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USMC
9	COMTIC BR 1C+	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Rapid Prototype <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = -	25	MEDUSA <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Fixed / Semi-F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USAF
10	Darkridge	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Dismounted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = BGS	26	MEDUSA Mobile	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USAF
11	DRAKE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USN	27	MOL II	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USMC
12	Drone Butler v1+	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Dismounted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = -	28	Morpheus	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Rapid Prototype <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = -
13	Drone Defender v1.5+	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Dismounted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = -	29	NDUA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Fixed / Semi-F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = SOCOM
14	DUKE v5	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USA			
15	I-LDS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = Fixed / Semi-F <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = USA			
16	IGGN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> groupType: GroupType = <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sponsor: string = SOCOM			

	Name	Test
☑	1 Detect and Track	(U) The Joint C-UAS capability shall detect and track multiple threat type /agent /multi-agent/swarm UASs simultaneously (group 1, 2 & 3) with 360 degree coverage in an operational electromagnetic environment prior to their effective range to support C-UAS operations.
☑	1.1 Detect and Track Size	(U/EUCO) Must detect and track UAS to include the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) weighing less than or equal to X lbs. (group 1-2) which may include a ground control station (GCS), X km on the ground and UAVs weighing > X lbs. (Group 3). (Annex A)
☑	1.2 Detect and Track Altitude	(U/EUCO) Must detect and track UAS operating at an altitude of ≤ X ft. Mean Sea Level (MSL) (Groups 1-2) and UAV(Group 3) at ≤ X MSL.
☑	1.3 Detect and Track Speed	(U/EUCO) Must detect and track UAS hovering and traveling ≤ X knots indicated airspeed (Groups 1-2) and UAV (Group 3) at ≤ X knots indicated airspeed.
☑	1.4 Detect and Track Range	(U/EUCO) Must detect at ranges to prevent threat UAS from performing ISR missions and attack operations
☑	1.4.1 Fixed Detect and Track Range	(U) The Joint C-UAS capability shall detect group 1, 2, & 3 UASs active and passively
☑	1.4.1.1 Fixed Active Sensor Threshold	(U) The Joint C-UAS capability shall detect group 1, 2, & 3 UASs active at ranges up to > x km (Group 1), > x km (Group 2) and > x km (Group 3)
☑	1.4.1.2 Fixed Active Sensor Objective	(U) The Joint C-UAS capability shall detect group 1, 2, & 3 UAS active at ranges up of > x km (Group 1), >x km (Group 2) and > x km (Group 3)
☑	1.4.1.3 Fixed Passive Sensor Threshold	(U) The Joint C-UAS capability shall detect group 1, 2, & 3 UAS passive at ranges up to > x km
☑	1.4.1.4 Fixed Passive Sensor Objective	(U) The Joint C-UAS capability shall detect group 1, 2, & 3 UAS passive at ranges up to > x km
☑	1.4.2 Mobile Detect and Track Range	(U) Mobile C-UAS capability shall detect group 1 & 2 UAS while on the move or at halt
☑	1.4.2.1 Mobile Active Sensor Threshold	(U) Mobile C-UAS capability shall detect group 1 & 2 UAS active at > x km
☑	1.4.2.2 Mobile Active Sensor Objective	(U) Mobile C-UAS capability shall detect group 1 & 2 UAS active at > x km
☑	1.4.2.3 Mobile Passive Sensor Threshold	(U) Mobile C-UAS capability shall detect group 1 & 2 UAS passive at > x km
☑	1.4.2.4 Mobile Passive Sensor Objective	(U) Mobile C-UAS capability shall detect group 1 & 2 UAS passive at > 8km
☑	1.5 Detect and Track Probability	(U) Joint C-UAS Capability shall track with > X probability of error for tracking based on method used for tracking/geo-location

		Product Type: Scopes the viewpoint of each product			
		REQUIREMENTS	BEHAVIOR	STRUCTURE	PARAMETERS
Mission Level: What problem is being modeled	Stakeholder Needs	Use Cases	System Context	Measures of Effectiveness	
	 Fixed / Semi-Fixed Mission Overview  C-UAS CDO Requirements	 Dynamic Targeting Use Case  C-UAS Dynamic Targeting	 C-UAS Systems	 Measures of Effectiveness  Cost Items	
System of Systems: Describes the SoS to address the problem and verify the solutions.	System Requirements	System Behavior	System Structure	Measures of Performance	
	 System Satisfy Matrix  Notional SoS	 C-UAS System A  C-UAS System B	 C-UAS System A  C-UAS System B	 System Sensing Performance  Kinetic Effectors Performance  Non Kinetic Effectors Performance	
System of Systems: Describes how the application will represent a portion of the problem space to validate the solutions	Simulation Requirements	Simulation Behavior	Simulation Structure	Test Case	
	 Simulation Requirements  To Be Config	 Simulation Behavior  To Be Config	 Simulation Structure  To Be Systems		

	Name	Source	Target	Range KM	PD	False Alarm Rate Per Hour
<input type="checkbox"/>	2.3.2 C-UAS System Building Blocks					
<input type="checkbox"/>	BLUE					
<input type="checkbox"/>	C-UAS System A					
		 C-UAS System A Se...	 DII	5	1	
<input type="checkbox"/>	C-UAS System B					
<input type="checkbox"/>	Subsystems					
<input type="checkbox"/>	Radar B					
		 Radar B	 DII	25	0.75	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Radar A					
		 Radar A	 DII	15	0.75	10
<input type="checkbox"/>	Dismount Sensor					
		 Dismount Sensor	 DII	1.82	0.7	
<input type="checkbox"/>	RED					
<input type="checkbox"/>	Sensors					
		 EO/IR Camera	 I/VT	1.852	1	
<input type="checkbox"/>	2.3.4 Placeholder Systems					


[illegible]

△ Name	○ unitCost	○ expends
 C-UAS System A	150	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>
 C2	50	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>
 Dismount Effector	30	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>
 Dismount Sensor	10	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>
 EW Effector	100	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>
 Interceptor	20	 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> true
 Interceptor Launcher	1000	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>
 Radar A	3416	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>
 Radar B	5000	 <input type="checkbox"/> <undefined>

#	Name	Documentation	Specification
1	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> JSR Mission		
2	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Spider Chart MOEs		
3	() % of Red threats killed before Threshold requirement Range from <u>HVT</u>	Of the total # of red threats flown, how many are killed before they get to skin - 4.3 nm The <u>HVT</u> "Ground Truth" lost events will be good for this # threat is not killed, use 0	# lost
4	() % of Red threats killed before <u>HVT</u> detection	Of the total # of red threats flown in, how many can detect the <u>HVT</u> at all, (do they get close enough to use their sensor?)	# of red that make at least 1 sense of <u>HVT</u> / # of total red (5)
5	() % of Red Collects Prevented	In comparison to the baseline - how many collects does the blue defense prevent - good normalized metric	# average detects for architecture in single replication / # detects in baseline
6	() % of Red threats killed	Of the total # of read threats flown in, what % are neutralized	# killed / # of total red (5)
7	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Cost Metrics		
8	() % of Non-Kinetic vs Kinetic Kills		# of kills logged by a weapon that starts with <u>EW</u> / total kills
9	() Average Cost of Config		Average total cost of config (use # of expended coyote for Coyote costs)
10	() R(T) Collected	How long can the red platforms detect blue assets?	for each red use-> T_last_detect - T_first_detect
11	() R(T) Shared	How long can the red platforms share detections of blue assets back to their controller?	for each red use -> T_last_report - T_first_report
12	() R # Collected	How many detects does the red platform have on the <u>HVT</u>	for any red platform, total # of detects




Data Exchange with Operational Simulation



Data Visualization & MOE Analysis

Deep Dive a Single Architecture


- System contribution to effectiveness across the kill chain
- Actual detect / kill locations
- Heat maps of detections and kills



Data Visualization & MOE Analysis

Directly Compare Two Architectures

- Dynamic updates
- Various MOEs defined by the analyst
- Heat maps of detections and kills



Lessons Learned

- Access to collaborative tools directly correlates to efficiency – *NERVE provided ability to move quickly even in the COVID-19 work environment*
- Security-driven logistical hurdles can cause work to slow – *Classified analysis required multiple air-gapped networks to complete; a SIPR cloud network is essential*
- Sponsor-provided data is both a limiting factor and a driver of success – *JIAMDO struggled to obtain data from CCMDs and Services; once provided, data (and sponsor SME access) enabled feasible and authoritative analysis*
- The right people are critical – *Task succeeded due to team's skillsets and availability*

Biggest obstacle – access to secure, cloud environment to support distributed teamwork



Keys to Success

Digital Access – *Take smart risks to develop tools and capabilities on unclassified systems where possible – but must have classified environment*

Data Access – *Sponsor must provide authoritative information as soon as possible*

Sponsor Access – *Frequent collaboration drives continued improvement and sponsor satisfaction*

People Access – *Modern digital tools require equally modern skillsets – find the right people up front*